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This article examines how the market quality of European cross-listed stocks is affected by the 
partial-day availability of close substitutes, i.e., shares of the same companies that are traded in their 
home markets but are not fully fungible with the cross-listed shares. Our findings suggest that 
narrower spreads and more competitive liquidity provision during overlapping trading hours reflect a 
significant impact from the availability of more substitutes in addition to the enhanced information 
environment and liquidity externalities when home markets are open. Our results also provide a richer 
picture of specialists’ intraday activities and offer new evidence of market integration.  
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In an integrated market environment, a cross-listed stock’s trading should be influenced by 
activity in its home-market counterpart.1 Furthermore, many U.S. investors view home-market shares 
as potential substitutes for cross-listed stocks, the traditional vehicle for international diversification 
(JPMorgan, 2003). A natural question for investors and researchers is how cross-listed stock trading is 
affected by the availability of home-market substitutes when cross-listing and home markets are both 
open (overlapping trading hours). 
Hagerty (1991) predicts that increasing the number of substitute assets in a market reduces a 
liquidity provider’s ability to set wide spreads and thus improves market quality. Sengupta (2005) 
derives an analogous prediction for substitute assets trading in different markets: He predicts that the 
competition from liquidity providers in the home market limits the ability of liquidity providers in a 
cross-listing market to set wide spreads. Both models presume the existence of close substitute assets, 
while empirical work shows that stocks of different firms even in the same industry and sharing other 
fundamental characteristics are generally imperfect substitutes (e.g., Shleifer, 1986; Beneish and 
Whaley, 1996; and Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997). In this paper, we use cross-listed stocks and their 
home-market counterparts, which are closer to perfect substitutes although not fully fungible, to study 
the impact of substitutes on stock trading. In particular, we analyze transaction costs, displayed 
liquidity, and the behavior of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) specialists for European cross-
listed stocks during overlapping trading hours and nonoverlapping trading hours (when only the 
NYSE is open), to determine empirically how the availability of more substitutes affects stock trading. 
We also examine to what extent these effects are distinct from the effects of heightened information 
production and positive liquidity externalities during overlapping trading hours.  
European cross-listed stocks offer several advantages for analyzing how the availability of 
substitutes affects liquidity provision and trading. European market trading hours partially overlap 
                                                 
1 Karolyi (2006) documents that there are 2,300 cross-listed stocks worldwide. The cross-listed stocks of 467 
companies accounted for 10.2% of NYSE trading volume in 2003, with the largest trading share coming from 
European companies. Cross-listed stock trading has been increasing as a percentage of overall stock trading on 
the NYSE since 2003. For a theoretical analysis of why companies choose to cross-list, see, for example, 
Foucault and Gehrig (2008).  
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U.S. market trading hours, so we can observe cross-listed stocks trading daily with and without home-
market substitutes available. Most European cross-listed stocks are from developed home markets, and 
investor surveys find that cross-listed and home-market stocks from developed markets are generally 
viewed as substitutes, while emerging-market stocks are less likely to be viewed as substitutes for their 
cross-listed counterparts (JPMorgan, 2003). Finally, the universe of European cross-listed stocks 
includes thinly traded as well as actively traded stocks, allowing us to analyze a broad cross-section of 
firms.  
Our study reveals many differences in cross-listed stock trading when home markets are open 
versus when they are not. We find that European cross-listed stock spreads are significantly lower 
during overlapping trading hours than during nonoverlapping trading hours. We also find that quoted 
depth, comprising displayed liquidity from public limit orders, floor brokers, and the specialist, is 
significantly greater during overlapping than during nonoverlapping trading hours.2 In addition to 
more liquidity being displayed during overlapping trading hours, we find that the specialist is 
significantly less active in European cross-listed stocks during overlapping trading hours. Further 
analysis shows that these results reflect the impact of an additional substitute asset improving market 
quality by increasing competition among liquidity providers, as predicted by Hagerty (1991) and 
Sengupta (2005), in addition to the heightened information production and positive liquidity 
externalities during overlapping trading hours.  
This paper is related to research on the links between home-market and cross-listed stock 
trading. Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1998) posit that even as markets become more accessible 
globally, the impact of home-market trading on cross-listed trading depends on the degree 
informational integration between the markets. Bacidore and Sofianos (2002) find that full-day 
transaction costs are higher for cross-listed stocks than for U.S. stocks, all else equal, because of the 
higher adverse selection and realized spreads in cross-listed stocks. Bacidore, Battalio, Galpin, and 
                                                 
2 Our quoted depth results are consistent with the findings for European cross-listed stocks in Bacidore, Battalio, 
Galpin, and Jennings (2005), whose focus is how depth varies for cross-listed stocks from emerging versus 
developed markets.  
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Jennings (2005) find that quoted depth is larger (smaller) for NYSE cross-listed stocks from developed 
(emerging) markets during overlapping trading hours. Sengupta (2005) finds that at the NYSE open 
quoted spreads are lower for actively-traded European cross-listed stocks, consistent with Howe and 
Ragan’s (2002) finding that at the NYSE open volatility is lower for European cross-listed stocks than 
for U.S. stocks. Both papers suggest that home-market trading influences European cross-listed stock 
trading at the NYSE open.  
Our paper presents the first study that examines intraday liquidity provision and transaction 
costs together, highlighting the effects of competitive liquidity provision for substitute securities on 
market quality throughout the trading day, not only at the open. Our focus on how the competition 
from home-market substitutes affects liquidity provision in cross-listed stocks also reveals a 
previously unexplored richness in the specialist’s intraday role. We find that the specialist’s higher 
overall participation in cross-listed versus U.S. stock trading, documented in Bacidore and Sofianos 
(2002), is comprised of lower participation during overlapping trading hours and higher participation 
after European markets close, at least in part reflecting changes in the competition among liquidity 
providers.  
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 1 provides a review of related literature 
and discussion of cross-listed and home-market stock substitutability. Section 2 discusses the data and 
methodology. Section 3 presents our key empirical findings and relates them to theoretical predictions. 
Section 4 concludes.  
1. Background  
1.1. Research on substitute assets and on cross-listed stock trading 
Our main theoretical motivation comes from Hagerty (1991) and Sengupta (2005). Hagerty 
models bid-ask spreads in markets with multiple assets and shows that a liquidity provider’s ability to 
set wide spreads is limited by the existence of substitutes in the same market. Hagerty finds that 
increasing the number of substitutes lowers the equilibrium spread for an asset because liquidity 
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providers compete for demand from traders choosing between substitute assets. Sengupta (2005) 
extends this intuition to competing markets and finds analogously that intermarket competition from 
home-market shares should lower spreads for cross-listed stocks. Parlour and Seppi (2003) examine a 
richer model of intermarket competition for substitutes. They find that competition between a pure 
limit order market (like most European exchanges) and a hybrid market with both a specialist and a 
limit order book (like the NYSE) can lead to either better or worse market quality than a hybrid market 
trading alone, depending on traders’ order preferencing rules, which are not readily observable.  
Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1998) predict that the market quality of cross-listed stocks 
depends on the degree to which home and cross-listing markets are linked informationally. If markets 
are sufficiently segmented informationally, trading costs are higher for cross-listed stocks because of 
the greater adverse selection arising from the existence of arbitrageurs who exploit pricing differences 
between the home and cross-listing markets at the expense of liquidity providers in the cross-listing 
market. Building on the intuition of Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1998), Bacidore and Sofianos 
(2002) examine how the intrinsic differences between U.S. and cross-listed stocks affect the market 
quality and specialist activity in cross-listed stocks relative to U.S. stocks. Focusing on full-day 
trading activity, they find higher adverse selection in cross-listed stocks, which leads to wider spreads 
and lower specialist inventory positions in cross-listed stocks compared to U.S. stocks. While 
Bacidore and Sofianos (2002) acknowledge the importance of whether the home and cross-listing 
markets’ trading hours overlap, they do not examine intraday changes.  
Several empirical studies document that trading volume and volatility are generally higher for 
cross-listed stocks from developed markets when their home markets are open (e.g., Howe and Ragan, 
2002; and Menkveld, 2008). Higher volume during overlapping trading hours is attributed to the 
tendency of traders to cluster in time, as in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), and arbitrage and order-
splitting across markets, as modeled in Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) and Menkveld (2008).  
Also related to our work are studies linking the higher volatility of cross-listed stocks when 
their home markets are open to greater price discovery in the richer information environment of 
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overlapping trading hours. Studies largely agree that for firms from developed home markets, 
information production and price discovery are greater when cross-listing and home markets are both 
open (e.g., Werner and Kleidon, 1996; Grammig, Melvin, and Schlag, 2005a; Menkveld, Koopman, 
and Lucas, 2006; Pascual, Pascual-Fuster, and Climent, 2006; and Phylaktis and Korczak, 2006). In 
the present study, we investigate whether cross-listed stock trading is affected by the availability of 
home-market substitutes beyond the effects of the enhanced information environment.  
A growing body of research shows that cross-listed and home-market shares generally trade 
near price parity, adjusted for conversion costs [e.g., Eun and Sabherwal (2003) on Canadian stocks, 
Grammig, Melvin, and Schlag (2005b) on British, Canadian, French, and German stocks, and 
Phylaktis and Korczak (2006) on British and French stocks]. In one of the most comprehensive studies 
to date, Gagnon and Karolyi (2004) examine cross-listed and home-market stock pairs from 39 
countries and find that price discrepancies are small on average, are most extreme in emerging 
markets, and are generally reversed within one day, suggesting that active arbitrageurs enforce parity. 
These findings suggest that global market integration has increased significantly since Werner and 
Kleidon’s (1996) finding that the NYSE and the LSE were not integrated in 1991. Price parity 
between European cross-listed and home-market stocks is also a natural requirement for, and perhaps 
evidence of, traders’ considering them substitutes for each other.  
1.2. Cross-listed stocks and home-market stocks as substitutes  
Cross-listed stocks and their home-market counterparts represent equity exposure to the same 
firm and thus should be closer substitutes than, for example, the domestic shares of two different firms 
in the same industry. But home-market and cross-listed shares are distinct securities and are not fully 
fungible, so they are not perfect substitutes. There are three main types of cross-listed stocks traded on 
the NYSE, and they differ in how close they are to being fully fungible with their home-market 
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stocks.3  
Most cross-listed stocks on the NYSE are American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). ADRs are 
derivative instruments backed by home-market shares. To create ADRs, a depositary bank buys home-
market shares, places them with a custodian, and issues new dollar-denominated certificates. ADRs 
and home-market shares are not fungible: Different securities are traded in the U.S. and the home 
market, and the depositary bank charges a conversion fee to switch between them. Individual countries 
can also tax conversions. A notable example is the United Kingdom, which levies a 150 basis point 
Stamp Duty Reserve Tax on each British common share that is transferred to an ADR.  
New York Registered Shares (NY Shares) are U.S. dollar-denominated certificates issued by 
(mostly Dutch) companies specifically for the U.S. market. NY Shares represent direct claims on the 
company; they are not derivative securities like ADRs. But as with ADRs, NY Shares are not fungible 
with home-market shares and holders must pay a conversion fee to switch between them.  
Global Shares are a single class of ordinary shares trading on both the NYSE and the home 
market. The certificate traded on the NYSE is indistinguishable from that traded on the home market, 
both represent direct claims on the company, and there are no conversion fees. Nonetheless, Global 
Shares are not fully fungible, since investors buying Global Shares on the NYSE (home market) must 
hold them in U.S. dollars (home currency) and receive U.S. dollar (home currency) dividends.  
A recent survey reveals that many institutional investors view cross-listed stocks and home-
market stocks from developed markets as substitutes (JPMorgan, 2003). A third of the surveyed 
investors say they would buy either instrument depending on relative liquidity and pricing or are 
indifferent between the two instruments. The one-third of respondents who prefer home-market stocks 
cite the broader array of companies available and greater liquidity, while the one-third who prefer 
cross-listed stocks cite lower holding costs and lower risk, particularly for emerging market stocks.  
                                                 
3 For a more detailed discussion of cross-listed securities’ fungibility see Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and 
Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999). For a description of the mechanics of arbitraging cross-listed and home-market 
stocks, see Gagnon and Karolyi (2004). 
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2. Data and Methodology 
2.1. Sample construction and descriptive statistics 
There are 186 European stocks cross-listed on the NYSE as of year-end 2003, according to the 
NYSE Non-U.S. Companies database. We eliminate 18 stocks that do not have information available 
from the CRSP database, 12 that have no home-market listing, 11 whose home-market trading hours 
do not overlap NYSE trading hours, four that split, three that are newly listed during 2003, two with 
changes in their ADR ratios, and one with only one trade in 2003. The remaining 135 stocks constitute 
our European cross-listed sample.4 The sample comprises 122 ADRs, nine NY Shares, and four Global 
Shares. On average in 2003, 7.2% of the companies’ global equity trading volume occurs in the U.S., 
with a range of less than 1% to more than 99%.5 Figure 1 shows the sample distribution across the 14 
European home exchanges and the overlap between European exchanges and NYSE trading hours.  
[Figure 1 Here] 
We construct a matched sample of U.S. domestic stocks listed on the NYSE for the 135 
European cross-listed stocks. From the universe of U.S. stocks, we first eliminate stocks that are cross-
listed on European exchanges and stocks that split during 2003. We then use CRSP data to determine a 
unique match for each stock in our European sample based on NYSE daily price, volatility, and 
volume during 2003.6 For each European stock, we choose the U.S. domestic stock that minimizes the 
                                                 
4 Although some of these stocks are thinly traded, as detailed in Table 1, excluding stocks with five or fewer 
trades per day on average yields qualitatively similar results, so we present only the full-sample results.  
5 About half of the sample stocks are cross-listed in one or more other countries in addition to the U.S. Such 
“third-market” listings should not significantly affect our results, as most of the third-market listings are in other 
European markets with similar trading hours to the home markets. For the average sample stock, 4% of its global 
trading volume occurs in European markets outside its home market and 0.1% of its global trading volume 
occurs in Asian markets in 2003. Our results are robust to the exclusion of stocks with third-market listings.  
6 We use volume rather than market capitalization in our matching criteria because we find inconsistencies in 
CRSP market capitalization for cross-listed stocks: CRSP market capitalization appears to reflect the entire 
global equity for some firms but only the cross-listed equity for other firms. Our results do not appear to be 
driven by our choice of matching criteria or the differences in matching variables for the pairs selected. 
Regression analysis of our results on the differences in our matching variables (price, volatility, and volume), 
difference in CRSP market capitalization, and difference in intraday volume changes shows that these factors do 
not explain our results. We also analyze an alternative matched sample of U.S. stocks chosen based on price, 
volatility, and global (rather than NYSE only) volume. Intraday patterns of transaction costs and liquidity 
provision for this alternative matched sample are qualitatively similar to our original matched sample results and 
yield identical inference. Detailed results of all robustness checks are available on request.  
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where XiUS denotes the value of the ith matching variable for the U.S. stock, and XiEur denotes the value 
of the ith matching variable for the European stock. The mean p-score for the matches is 0.14, with a 
median of 0.11.  
We also construct four other cross-listed stock samples. Starting with the NYSE Non-U.S. 
Companies database and eliminating stocks that split, change symbol, have no home listing, or are 
listed for only part of the year, we obtain samples of 69 Asian, 66 Canadian, and 64 Latin American 
cross-listed stocks.7 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all five samples during the entire NYSE 
trading day.  
[Table 1 Here] 
The main sample period for our analysis is the 221 days in 2003 on which the NYSE and all 
14 European home exchanges were open for full trading days, excluding the week between the change 
to daylight savings time in Europe and the U.S. We also examine the holidays on which the home 
exchanges are closed and the NYSE is open. The number of home-exchange holidays on which the 
NYSE is open ranges from two to ten, averaging four days for the European cross-listed sample.  
2.2. Data and measures 
We use data from the NYSE Consolidated Trade (CT), Consolidated Quote (CQ), Specialist 
Equity Trade (SPET), and System Order Data (SOD) files. After filtering these data to remove bad 
trades and quotes,8 we construct several measures of trading activity, transaction costs, and liquidity 
                                                 
7 About 40% of the Asian cross-listed stocks and a quarter of the Canadian and Latin American cross-listed 
stocks are also cross-listed on European exchanges, but these third-market listings account for less than 1% of 
global trading volume on average in 2003.  
8 We use regular NYSE trade records, filtering out cancels, errors, late reports, bunched, bunched sold, and 
average-price transactions. We also exclude trades with price or size equal to zero and trades with price changes 
of 20% or more from the previous trade. These filters remove less than 0.3% of the original trade records. We 
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provision.  
To summarize trading activity, we examine each stock’s average volume, number of trades, 
and intraday volatility. The volatility measure, the intraday relative range volatility, is defined as the 
five-minute high-low range divided by the last transaction price in the interval. We also calculate 
volatility measured as the standard deviation of five-minute midquote returns as a robustness check.  
We focus on quoted and effective spreads to assess trading costs. We calculate percentage 
spreads to control for any effects caused purely by stock price differences. The percentage quoted 
spread is the difference between the best offer and the best bid price, divided by the quote midpoint.  
The percentage effective spread is defined as:  
Percentage Effective Spreadt = 2I(Pt – Mt) / Pt , 
where I is an indicator variable that equals one for buyer-initiated trades and negative one for seller-
initiated trades, Pt is the trade price, and Mt is the quote midpoint at the time of the trade. We 
categorize trades as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) if they occur above (below) the prevailing quote 
midpoint; trades occurring at the quote midpoint are categorized using the Lee and Ready (1991) 
algorithm. We use contemporaneous quotes to sign trades; see Bessembinder (2003).9 The effective 
spread captures the immediate price impact of a trade.  
We further decompose the effective spread into the realized spread and the information 
content of the trade. The percentage realized spread is defined as: 
Percentage Realized Spreadt = 2I(Pt – Mt+5) / Pt , 
where Mt+5 is the quote midpoint five minutes after the trade. We also calculate realized spreads using 
the quote midpoint 30 minutes after the trade and using the next day’s opening price, as robustness 
                                                                                                                                                        
use regular NYSE quote records, filtering out quotes that are indicated to be errors, related to special mode 
conditions, and locked or crossed bid and ask. We also exclude quotes with zero or missing bid or ask prices or 
depth, quotes that change 20% or more from the previous quote, and quotes whose spread exceeds 20% of the 
quote midpoint. These filters remove less than 0.1% of the quote records. To reduce the quote data to a 
manageable size, we keep only the first quote in each second.  
9 While possible misclassification of trades could influence our spread estimates, any resulting bias should be 
less of a concern for comparing differences in spreads intraday and between different stock samples. Indeed, if 
the bias is constant intraday and across samples, our estimates of differences are unbiased.  
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checks. The realized spread measures the price reversal after a trade, approximating the liquidity 
provider’s profit net of the trade’s price impact.  
The difference between the effective spread (what liquidity demanders pay) and the realized 
spread (what liquidity providers earn) is used as a measure of the information content of a trade. The 
information content is equal to the signed difference between the quote midpoints at the time of the 
trade and five minutes after the trade, as a percentage of the trade price. 
We focus on quoted depth and the specialist participation rate to capture liquidity provision. 
The quoted depth includes liquidity displayed by public limit orders, floor brokers, and the specialist, 
and is calculated as the average depth at the NYSE best bid and best offer. Within this group of 
participants, the specialist is often considered the liquidity provider of last resort because of his 
affirmative obligation to ensure a “fair and orderly” market (NYSE, 1999, Rule 104) and his unique 
ability to observe and react quickly to activity on the trading floor and incoming electronic orders (see 
Panayides, 2007). These structural advantages that accrue to the specialist likely make him the most 
important liquidity provider trading a stock, although he is not the only liquidity provider. Boehmer 
and Wu (2006) find positive correlations among the signed trading activity of liquidity providers on 
the NYSE. We define the specialist participation rate as the sum of specialist purchase volume and 
sale volume, divided by total trading volume.10   
3. Results 
This section first presents our main analysis of how European cross-listed stocks trade on the 
NYSE when their home markets are open versus when they are closed. Second, it explores to what 
extent the availability of substitutes and the enhanced information environment, which are both related 
to home-market trading, explain our findings. Third, it examines whether factors unrelated to home-
market trading, such as time-of-day effects and cross-listed stock characteristics, explain our findings.  
                                                 
10 The NYSE reports the specialist participation rate as the sum of specialist purchases and sales divided by total 
purchases and sales (twice total volume). We use single-counted volume in the denominator to be consistent with 
prior work such as Bacidore and Sofianos (2002) and Madhavan and Sofianos (1998).  
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3.1. Overlapping versus nonoverlapping trading in European cross-listed stocks  
We examine differences in trading activity, transaction costs, and liquidity provision for 
European cross-listed stocks on the NYSE between trading hours when their home exchanges are open 
(overlapping period) and when their home exchanges are closed (nonoverlapping period). The 
overlapping period for each cross-listed stock extends from the NYSE open at 9:30 a.m. EST until the 
cross-listed stock’s home exchange closes. We define the nonoverlapping period to be an equal-length 
period beginning immediately after the home exchange closes. For example, for a cross-listed stock 
whose home exchange is the LSE, the overlapping period is 9:30 a.m. to 11:35 a.m. and the 
nonoverlapping period is 11:35:01 a.m. to 1:40 p.m. EST. We choose equal-length overlapping and 
nonoverlapping periods in the spirit of an event study, where our event is the daily closing of a cross-
listed stock’s home exchange. Our results are robust to alternative intraday-period definitions.11  
We calculate trading activity, transaction cost, and liquidity provision measures for the 
overlapping and the non-overlapping period for each stock on each day, applying the same 
overlapping and nonoverlapping periods to each matched pair of stocks. Overlapping and 
nonoverlapping averages are then calculated for each stock across the 221 sample days, and cross-
sectional means, mean differences, and matched-pair difference-of-differences are reported in Table 2. 
We conduct significance tests on relative differences (taking the logarithm of each measure before 
computing standard errors and conducting the t-test for a difference in means) to address issues of 
heteroscedasticity in this and subsequent tables. For ease of interpretation, we report the actual means.  
Nonparametric tests on median differences yield identical inferences and are available on request.  
[Table 2 Here] 
Panel A of Table 2 compares intraday trading activity for the European and U.S. matched 
                                                 
11 When we define the nonoverlapping period to include the remainder of the NYSE trading day, rather than to 
match the length of the overlapping period, we find qualitatively similar results. When we exclude the first 15 
minutes of NYSE trading, reduce the intraday periods to 30 minutes before and after the home exchange closes, 
or exclude the 15 minutes before and after the home exchange closes, we find qualitatively similar results. The 
results are also qualitatively similar when we exclude the 11 European cross-listed stocks with less than two 
hours of overlap with their home exchanges. 
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samples. As in previous studies, we find that both samples have higher share volume and volatility 
during overlapping trading hours.12 This evidence is consistent with the effects of arbitrage trading, 
order splitting, and heightened information production during overlapping trading hours.  
Panel B of Table 2 analyzes how transaction costs differ during overlapping and 
nonoverlapping trading hours. We know from Bacidore and Sofianos (2002) that cross-listed stocks 
generally have higher transaction costs in full-day trading than U.S. stocks, all else equal. Thus we are 
not surprised to find significantly higher spreads for European cross-listed stocks than their U.S. 
matches in both intraday periods.13 Our novel finding is that quoted and effective spreads for the 
European cross-listed sample are significantly lower during the overlapping period than during the 
nonoverlapping period.14 Lower spreads during the overlapping period may be due to the availability 
of a home-market substitute and/or greater information production and price discovery lowering the 
adverse selection risk, since U.S.-based traders can observe home-market quotes during overlapping 
trading hours. In contrast, quoted and effective spreads for the U.S. matched sample are significantly 
higher during the overlapping period than during the nonoverlapping period, reflecting the well-known 
intraday pattern of U.S. stocks.   
Panel C of Table 2 analyzes how liquidity provision differs in overlapping and 
nonoverlapping trading hours. Quoted depth is significantly higher in overlapping than in 
nonoverlapping periods for the European cross-listed stocks, which likely reflects greater competition 
among liquidity providers.15 In contrast, quoted depth is significantly lower in overlapping than in 
nonoverlapping periods for the U.S. stocks. We find that the specialist participation rate is sharply 
lower for European cross-listed stocks during overlapping trading hours, consistent with the notion 
                                                 
12 These results are qualitatively similar for both the intraday relative range volatility reported here and the 
volatility measured as the standard deviation of five-minute midquote returns; results are available on request. 
13 Similar results obtain for full-day transaction costs in our sample; results available on request. 
14 Volume-weighted effective spreads are reported in Table 2. Trade-weighted spreads lead to identical 
inference; results are available on request.  
15 Our study measures displayed liquidity only, but Bacidore, Battalio, Galpin, and Jennings (2005) find that 
undisplayed liquidity (provided by floor brokers and the specialist on the floor, not displayed in the quoted 
depth) is unchanged for European cross-listed stocks in overlapping versus nonoverlapping trading hours.  
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that the specialist is less active when liquidity provision is more competitive during overlapping 
trading hours. In contrast, the U.S. matched stocks exhibit a higher specialist participation rate during 
the overlapping period.16  
Taken together, these results show that transaction costs and liquidity provision differ 
dramatically for European cross-listed stocks when their home markets are open versus when they are 
closed.  
3.2. Explanations related to home-market trading 
There are two main theories of how European cross-listed stock trading may be affected by 
home-market trading during overlapping trading hours. First, Hagerty (1991) and Sengupta (2005) 
suggest that increasing the number of substitutes lowers the equilibrium spread for an asset because 
liquidity providers compete for demand from traders choosing between substitute assets. Since 
institutional investors generally view home-market stocks from developed markets as substitutes for 
cross-listed stocks, this theory predicts lower spreads and lower specialist participation rates as 
specialists face greater competition from other liquidity providers during overlapping trading hours.  
Second, many studies find that for firms from developed home markets, overlapping trading 
hours are characterized by greater information production and price discovery (e.g., Grammig, Melvin, 
and Schlag, 2005a; Menkveld, Koopman, and Lucas, 2006; and Phylaktis and Korczak, 2006), which 
are likely to lead to positive liquidity externalities. In models such as Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) 
liquidity externalities arise when traders come together to reduce search and trading costs, including 
adverse selection, or the risk of trading against more informed counterparties. In European cross-listed 
stocks, such liquidity externalities may arise with greater information production because the global 
pool of traders is larger or because traders concentrate their trades during overlapping trading hours. 
Positive liquidity externalities predict lower spreads and lower specialist participation rates, because 
                                                 
16 The difference in specialist participation rate changes does not appear to be due to the NYSE’s Price 
Continuity Rule (PCR), part of the specialist’s affirmative obligation (see Panayides, 2007). The PCR binds 
virtually the same amount of time during the overlapping and nonoverlapping periods: about 6% of the time for 
the European cross-listed stocks and about 7% of the time for the U.S. matched sample.  
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there is less need for the specialist to act as liquidity provider of last resort when information 
asymmetries are lower, during overlapping trading hours.  
Thus both the availability of home-market substitutes and the enhanced information 
environment could lead to lower transaction costs and lower specialist participation rates during 
overlapping trading hours. In this section we attempt to disentangle these two potential explanations 
by examining effective spread decompositions and cross-sectional stock differences.17  
We first examine to what extent the intraday changes in effective spreads for European cross-
listed stocks can be attributed to (i) changes in competition among liquidity providers, reflecting the 
impact of increased substitute availability (as in Hagerty, 1991), versus (ii) changes in the information 
content of trades, reflecting adverse-selection-based liquidity externalities (as in Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 1988). In Table 3, we decompose the effective spread results from Table 2 into two parts: 
the realized spread, which approximates a liquidity provider’s profit and should reflect the impact of 
the additional substitutes, and the information content of a trade, which approximates the adverse 
selection in a trade and should reflect liquidity externalities. We know from Bacidore and Sofianos 
(2002) that cross-listed stocks generally have higher realized spreads and information content in full-
day trading than U.S. stocks, all else equal. Thus we are not surprised to find significantly higher 
realized spreads for European cross-listed stocks than their U.S. matches in both intraday periods. But 
Table 3 also shows that realized spreads are significantly lower for European cross-listed stocks when 
their home markets are open than when they are closed,18 consistent with Hagerty’s (1991) and 
Sengupta’s (2005)  predictions that liquidity provider profits should be lower when more substitutes 
                                                 
17 A third possible explanation is that liquidity providers quote tighter spreads during overlapping trading hours 
because they can hedge their cross-listed stock positions with home-market shares. Unfortunately, we are unable 
to observe the trading activity of specialists or other market makers in European markets. Analysis of specialist 
inventories on the NYSE shows that they do not take larger cross-listed stock positions during overlapping 
trading hours than during nonoverlapping trading hours, nor do specialists take larger positions in cross-listed 
stocks than in the matched U.S. stocks during overlapping trading hours. Both findings suggest that hedging with 
home-market shares is not a major contributor to cross-listed stock liquidity during overlapping trading hours.  
18 Realized spreads and information content based on the quote midpoint five minutes after each trade are 
reported in Table 3. Alternative measures of realized spreads and information content based on the quote 
midpoint 30 minutes after each trade and based on opening prices the following day are qualitatively similar and 
are available on request. 
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are available. The information content of trades is also significantly lower for European cross-listed 
stocks when their home markets are open than when they are closed, suggesting that adverse-selection-
based liquidity externalities are present during overlapping trading hours.19  
[Table 3 Here] 
We next examine to what extent intraday changes in effective spreads and specialist 
participation rates are related cross-sectionally to the strength of a cross-listed stock’s home-market 
substitute and its home-market information environment, to help us disentangle these two potential 
effects. We run the following cross-sectional regression, using annual averages for the dependent 
variables for each stock to reduce the noise of daily estimates. Robust standard errors control for 





























where IntradayDiff is the overlap-nonoverlap difference in effective spread or participation rate for the 
European cross-listed stocks. As a proxy for the strength of the home-market substitute 
(SubstituteStrength), we use the percentage of a firm’s global equity trading that occurs in Europe, 
because a more actively traded home-market stock is likely to be viewed as a more attractive 
substitute.20 As a proxy for the home-market information environment (InfoEnvironment), we use an 
index of home-market development, calculated as the natural logarithm of the product of the 
shareholder rights index from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) and the rule of law index and the 
                                                 
19 This finding echoes Barclay and Hendershott's (2004) finding that adverse-selection-based liquidity 
externalities lead to lower information content for regular-hours than for after-hours trades in U.S. stocks. 
20 We considered additional proxies for the strength of the home-market substitute, but none provided enough 
cross-sectional variation for powerful tests. For example, our sample includes three types of cross-listed shares, 
but 122 are ADRs versus only nine NY Shares and four Global Shares. We also investigated whether conversion 
costs vary across cross-listed shares, but we were informed by practitioners at two of the largest ADR depositary 
banks that conversion costs do not vary across stocks. 
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accounting index from LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998).21 These indices are 
often used to quantify differences in country development and are highly correlated with home-market 
transparency, a key factor in the information environment for cross-listed stocks (e.g., Eleswarapu and 
Venkataraman, 2006). As a country-level control, we include HomeMktSize, equal to the home-
exchange market capitalization (that is, the market capitalization for all stocks traded on the home 
exchange). As controls for individual firm characteristics (FirmCharacteristic), we include the stock 
price and the firm’s global market capitalization. In our extended specification, we include 
overlapping-nonoverlapping trading volume differences (VolumeDifference), as a proxy for liquidity 
externalities arising from concentrated trading during overlapping trading hours,22 and stock-level 
controls (ControlVar) for intraday differences in trade size, volatility, quoted depth, quoted spread, 
and specialist firms.23  
[Table 4 Here] 
Table 4 presents the results from our cross-sectional regressions of overlap-nonoverlap 
differences in effective spread and participation rate for the European cross-listed stocks. Each 
explanatory variable is scaled by its cross-sectional standard deviation, so coefficient estimates 
represent the change in the dependent variable for a one-standard-deviation change in the explanatory 
variable. Recall that the effective spread and participation rate differences are negative in the European 
cross-listed sample: Spreads are narrower and specialist participation rates are lower during 
overlapping trading hours. The effective spread difference is more negative for firms with more of 
their global trading in Europe, our proxy for the strength of the home-market substitute, even after 
                                                 
21 Because the three market development indices are highly correlated for the European home markets, including 
the three measures as separate explanatory variables introduces considerable multicollinearity. Robustness 
checks using each index alone yield qualitatively similar results, available on request.  
22 Tests including the overlapping/nonoverlapping variance ratio as a proxy for the firm-specific information 
flow yield insignificant coefficients on the variance ratio variable, with other results qualitatively unchanged; 
results are available on request.  
23 Quoted spread differences are excluded from the effective spread difference regressions because including 
them would result in a test of price improvement (marginal change in effective spread relative to quoted spread), 
which is not the focus of the Hagerty (1991) or Sengupta (2005) predictions. Corwin (1999), Coughenour and 
Saad (2004), and Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, and Seasholes (2008) show that NYSE 
specialists have a significant impact on execution costs and liquidity. We include as explanatory variables the 
five largest specialist firms; the other two firms each handle only two sample stocks.  
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controlling for home-market and stock-level differences. A one-standard-deviation increase in the 
percentage of trading in Europe leads to about a five (six) basis point widening in the overlap-
nonoverlap effective spread difference in the basic (extended) specification, suggesting that the 
strength of the home-market substitute matters. We find weaker support for the role of the information 
environment in the effective spread regressions, as the coefficient estimate on home market 
development is significant in only our basic specification, and then only at the 10% level.  
Specialist participation rate differences are also more negative for stocks with more of their 
global trading volume in Europe, consistent with the substitutes hypothesis. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in the percentage of trading in Europe leads to about a two (one) basis point widening in the 
overlap-nonoverlap participation rate difference in the basic (extended) specification. The participation 
rate regressions also offer support for the information/externality hypothesis, with the coefficient on 
home-market development (our proxy for the openness of the home-market information environment) 
negative and significant in both specifications. A one-standard-deviation increase in the home-market 
development leads to a nearly two basis point widening in the overlap-nonoverlap participation rate 
difference, suggesting that adverse-selection based liquidity externalities affect specialists’ liquidity 
provision in cross-listed stocks.  
Collectively, these findings suggest that increased liquidity provider competition due to the 
availability of a home-market substitute contributes to the lower spreads and higher liquidity provision 
for European cross-listed stocks in overlapping trading hours, even after controlling for the enhanced 
information environment and potential liquidity externalities.  
3.2. Explanations unrelated to home-market trading 
In this section we consider two possible explanations for the intraday patterns of transaction 
costs and liquidity provision that are unrelated to whether European home markets are open or closed. 
First, because European home-exchange trading hours overlap the beginning of the NYSE trading day, 
the observed differences between overlapping and non-overlapping periods could simply be due to the 
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time of day. The matched sample analysis in Table 2 suggests that time-of-day effects do not explain 
the European cross-listed sample results. All of the transaction cost and liquidity provision measures 
exhibit opposite-sign intraday differences in the U.S. matched and European cross-listed samples, 
leading to significant overlap-nonoverlap difference-of-differences, although both samples have higher 
volume and volatility during overlapping trading hours.  
A second potential explanation for the transaction cost and liquidity provision changes 
documented in Table 2 is that these European cross-listed stocks or cross-listed stocks in general have 
certain characteristics other than their home-market trading hours that cause them to trade differently 
than U.S. domestic stocks. We explore these possibilities by examining the behavior of cross-listed 
stocks without overlapping trading hours: first, the European sample on home-exchange holidays; and 
second, other cross-listed samples with no overlapping or no nonoverlapping trading hours. 
Table 5 examines the European cross-listed stocks and their U.S. matches on European market 
holidays. This analysis focuses on the cross-section of 135 stocks, as in the regular trading day 
analysis of Table 2, but the holiday average for each stock is estimated from far fewer observations 
(two to ten holidays, compared to 221 non-holidays). Both the European cross-listed stocks and the 
U.S. matches follow the usual intraday pattern of higher volume and volatility during the period when 
both markets are normally open, although overall volumes are lower than on days when all exchanges 
are open. But on days when European markets are closed, European cross-listed stock spreads are 
higher in the “overlapping” period than in the nonoverlapping period, mimicking the pattern exhibited 
by the U.S. matched stocks and in contrast to the pattern of European stocks on days when their home 
markets are open. Likewise, European cross-listed stocks and their U.S. matches both exhibit lower 
quoted depth and higher specialist participation rates during the “overlapping” period than in the 
nonoverlapping period, in contrast to the European cross-listed stocks’ higher quoted depth and lower 
specialist participation rates during the overlapping period on days when their home markets are open. 
[Table 5 Here] 
Table 6 analyzes trading, transaction costs, and liquidity provision for Asian, Canadian, and 
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Latin American cross-listed stocks in the first versus second two hours of NYSE trading. Asian cross-
listed stocks have no home-market trading during either two-hour period, while Canadian and Latin 
American cross-listed stocks have home-market shares trading during both two-hour periods.24 The 
non-European cross-listed stocks generally exhibit intraday patterns of transaction costs and liquidity 
provision more similar to the U.S. matched stocks than to the European cross-listed stocks: Spreads 
are higher, quoted depth is lower, and the specialist participation rate is higher during the first two 
hours of trading than during the second two hours, as is the case for the U.S. matched stocks.   
[Table 6 Here] 
These results suggest that characteristics of cross-listed stocks other than their overlapping 
trading hours with their home markets do not explain the intraday changes in transaction costs and 
liquidity provision for European cross-listed stocks.  
4. Conclusion  
We find that European cross-listed stock spreads are lower and quoted depth is higher during 
overlapping trading hours than during nonoverlapping trading hours. In addition to more liquidity 
being displayed during overlapping trading hours, the specialist is less active in European cross-listed 
stocks during overlapping trading hours, suggesting that greater competition squeezes out the 
specialist as a liquidity provider. Taken together, these results suggest that the availability of home-
market substitutes increases competition among liquidity providers, leading to lower spreads. The 
effects of additional substitute availability remain significant after controlling for the enhanced 
information environment and liquidity externalities that characterize overlapping trading hours.  
Our findings suggest that there is a richer story behind the observation that specialists 
participate more in cross-listed stocks than in U.S. stocks. Although specialists are more active in 
European cross-listed stocks overall, they supply less liquidity when European markets are open. 
                                                 
24 Although some of the Asian, Canadian, and Latin American cross-listed stocks are also cross-listed on 
European exchanges, these third-market listings account for less than 1% of global trading volume on average. 
Our results are robust to the exclusion of cross-listed stocks with third-market listings.  
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Future work on specialists’ intraday trading may further illuminate how and when designated market 
makers enhance the trading process, a question of growing importance as more exchanges introduce 
designated market makers for less liquid stocks (see Venkataraman and Waisburd, 2007).  
Our results have potential implications for investors and cross-listing markets. Knowing how 
overlapping trading hours affect the liquidity of cross-listed stocks is valuable to investors choosing 
when to trade and to markets setting trading hours. Several U.S. markets are considering opening 
earlier in the morning, which would increase overlapping trading hours for many cross-listed stocks.  
This work also offers broader perspectives on how the trading of one asset is affected by the 
availability of additional substitutes, which may not only further our understanding of cross-listed 
stocks and their substitutable home-market stocks but also offer insights into the success and failure of 
new securities and derivatives, such as single-stock futures.  
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Price ($) Mean 24.40 23.06 22.97 21.97 14.54
Median 20.08 20.11 19.19 18.83 12.51
Min 2.16 2.27 2.17 3.23 1.03
Max 93.47 80.33 102.26 68.27 41.19
Daily High-Low Volatility (%) Mean 2.04 2.12 1.85 2.18 2.43
Median 1.93 1.96 1.76 1.99 2.15
Min 0.32 0.69 0.33 1.11 0.51
Max 6.51 5.91 6.78 4.16 6.70
Daily Volume (shares) Mean 305,162              287,041                277,925              498,730                165,657                   
Median 40,874                45,301                  53,454                66,189                  42,683                     
Min 1,117                  1,047                    775                     2,137                    1,271                       
Max 9,633,867           9,400,057             6,067,490           15,729,255           1,617,251                
Daily Volume ($) Mean 7,551,603           7,224,095             4,085,730           6,668,275             3,252,378                
Median 830,510              767,252                1,374,200           1,330,278             370,142                   
Min 6,130                  13,617                  19,335                14,929                  3,575                       
Max 153,339,255       184,335,443         59,230,704         61,930,835           50,346,424              
Daily Number of Trades Mean 236                     348                       174                     331                       136                          
Median 84                       121                       97                       142                       29                            
Min 2                         4                           3                         6                           2                              
Max 2,120                  3,512                    1,156                  1,549                    1,111                       
Mean 7.24 100 12.64 25.45 51.12
Median 1.90 100 7.08 15.08 46.68
Min 0.20 100 0.22 0.86 0.63
Max 99.49 100 83.38 88.94 97.94
Sample Size 135 135 69 66 64
U.S. Share of Global Volume in 
USD (%)
This table contains summary statistics based on full-day trading for five samples of stocks: European cross-listed stocks (CLS), matched U.S. 
domestic stocks, and Asian, Canadian, and Latin American cross-listed stocks. The European CLS and U.S. Match stocks are matched based on 
price, volatility, and volume. Averages for each stock are calculated over 221 days in 2003, and statistics are calculated across sample stocks using 
data from the NYSE CT and Non-U.S. Companies databases. All measures are based on the full trading day.




Share volume European 130,487 58,342 72,145 ***
U.S. Match 98,797 63,515 35,282 ***
Difference 31,675 *** -5,193 *** 36,868 ***
Number of trades European 88 55 33 ***
U.S. Match 114 85 29 ***
Difference -26 *** -30 *** 4 *
Intraday Volatility (bp) European 13.7 10.8 2.8 ***
U.S. Match 13.9 9.6 4.3 ***
Difference 0.0 *** 2.0 *** -2.0 ***
Quoted Spread (bp) European 70.6 86.3 -15.7 ***
U.S. Match 65.8 57.7 8.1 ***
Difference 5.0 * 28.8 *** -23.8 ***
Effective Spread (bp) European 52.5 64.1 -11.6 ***
U.S. Match 48.1 44.2 3.9 ***
Difference 3.7 *** 20.2 *** -16.5 ***
Quoted Depth (shares) European 1,640 1,104 536 ***
U.S. Match 769 839 -71 ***
Difference 872 *** 268 *** 604 ***
Participation Rate (%) European 40.3 46.2 -5.8 ***
U.S. Match 42.9 37.9 4.9 ***
Difference -2.9 *** 7.3 *** -10.6 ***
This table reports means for the European cross-listed sample (European) and the matched U.S. sample (U.S. Match) and mean differences 
across the 135 matched pairs of European and U.S. stocks. The overlapping period is when both the home exchange and the NYSE are 
open; the nonoverlapping period is the equal-length period immediately following the home-exchange close. Intraday volatility is the five-
minute high minus low price, divided by the last trade price. Quoted spread is the offer price minus the bid price, normalized by the quote 
midpoint and time-weighted. Effective spread is twice the difference between the trade price and the quote midpoint at the time of the trade, 
normalized by the trade price and volume-weighted. Quoted depth is the time-weighted average depth at the inside quotes. Participation rate 
is the sum of specialist buys and sells divided by total trading volume.  
Panel A: Trading Activity
Panel B: Transaction Costs
Panel C: Liquidity Provision
Data are from the NYSE CT, CQ, and SPET databases. Averages for each stock are calculated over 221 trading days in 2003. Significance 
tests  are based on relative differences (taking the logarithm of each measure before computing standard errors and conducting the t-test for 
a difference in means) across 135 stocks in each sample and across 135 matched pairs in difference-of-difference tests. Differences that are 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are designated by ***, **, and *, respectively.




Effective Spread (bp) European 52.5 64.1 -11.6 ***
U.S. Match 48.1 44.2 3.9 ***
Difference 3.7 *** 20.2 *** -16.5 ***
Realized Spread (bp) European 32.1 39.5 -7.4 ***
U.S. Match 24.4 22.1 2.3 ***
Difference 7.7 *** 17.4 *** -9.7 ***
Information Content (bp) European 20.4 24.6 -4.3 ***
U.S. Match 23.6 22.1 1.5 *
Difference -3.3 *** 2.5 *** -5.8 ***
This table reports means for the European cross-listed stock sample (European) and the matched U.S. stock sample (U.S. Match). The 
overlapping period is when both the home exchange and the NYSE are open; the nonoverlapping period is the equal-length period 
immediately following the home-exchange close. Effective spread is twice the difference between the trade price and the quote 
midpoint at the time of the trade. Realized spread is twice the difference between the trade price and the quote midpoint five minutes 
after the trade. Effective and realized spreads are normalized by the trade price and volume-weighted. Information content is the 
difference between the effective spread and the realized spread. 
Averages for each stock are calculated over 221 trading days in 2003. Significance tests are calculated across 135 stocks in each 
sample and across 135 matched pairs in difference-of-difference tests. Differences that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
are designated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Dependent Variable
%TradeEurope -5.194 ** -5.932 *** -1.897 ** -0.772 **
Home-market development -2.744 * -2.338 -1.650 *** -1.725 ***
Home-market size -2.927 -4.827 *** -2.752 *** -1.608 **
Price 3.196 * 4.256 ** 0.183 -0.682
Firm global market cap 6.418 *** 4.522 * 1.593 * 0.543
Volume difference -4.606 ** 1.286 *
Trade size difference 6.231 *** -1.270
Volatility difference 5.874 *** 1.344 **
Quoted depth difference -4.570 ** -0.872
Quoted spread difference -- 2.912 ***
Specialist = BWG 8.640 -0.169
Specialist = FLT 12.732 2.270
Specialist = LAB 10.681 -0.313
Specialist = SLK 3.347 0.755
Specialist = VDM -0.647 -1.467
Constant 45.055 59.629 ** 50.286 *** 41.360 ***
Observations 135             135             135             135             
Adj. R2 33.5% 48.5% 29.9% 45.7%
Table 4: European cross-listed stock cross-sectional regressions 
Effective Spread Difference (bp) Participation Rate Difference (bp)
This table reports results from cross-sectional regression analyses of the 135 European cross-listed stocks. Differences are 
overlapping - nonoverlapping period differences, averaged across 221 days per symbol. The overlapping period is when both the 
home exchange and the NYSE are open, and the nonoverlapping period is the equal-length time period immediately following the 
home exchange close. Effective spread is twice the difference between the trade price and the quote midpoint at the time of the trade. 
Participation rate is the sum of specialist buys and sells divided by total trading volume. 
%TradeEurope is a logit transformation of the percentage of the firm's global equity trading volume that occurred on European 
exchanges in 2003: log[%TradeEurope/(1-%TradeEurope)]. Home-market development is the natural logarithm of the product of the 
home market's country indices of shareholder rights from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) and law and accounting from LaPorta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). Home-market size is the total market capitalization for all firms listed on the home 
exchange, year-end 2003. 
Price is the natural logarithm of the average daily closing price. Firm global market cap is the natural logarithm of the firm's global 
market capitalization, year-end 2003. Volatility is the high minus low price, divided by the last trade price in the five-minute 
interval. Quoted depth is the average depth (in 100 shares) at the inside quotes on the NYSE. Quoted spread is the time-weighted 
average difference between the best offer and best bid. Specialist = BWG (Bear Wagner), FLT (Fleet), LAB (LaBranche), SLK 
(Spear, Leeds & Kellogg), and VDM (Van der Moolen) are indicator variables set equal to one if the cross-listed stock is handled by 
that specialist firm, else zero. All explanatory variables except indicator variables are scaled by their cross-sectional standard 
deviation, so the coefficient estimate represents the change in the dependent variable for a one-standard-deviation change in the 
explanatory variable.  Data are from the NYSE CT, CQ, SPET, and Non-U.S. Companies databases and from CRSP.  
Significance levels are based on robust standards errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity; *** / ** / * denote significance at the 1% 
/ 5% / 10% level.




Share volume Eur_Hols 81,218 51,753 30,790 ***
US_Hols 94,850 55,537 40,130 ***
Difference -15,605 *** -5,787 *** -9,961
Number of trades Eur_Hols 68 51 18 ***
US_Hols 116 80 38 ***
Difference -51 *** -32 *** -20 *
Intraday Volatility (bp) Eur_Hols 12.1 8.4 3.9 ***
US_Hols 13.8 8.8 5.1 ***
Difference -1.9 0.2 -2.1
Quoted Spread (bp) Eur_Hols 85.9 68.4 16.8 ***
US_Hols 65.6 55.7 9.9 ***
Difference 20.1 *** 14.0 *** 6.2
Effective Spread (bp) Eur_Hols 55.0 50.0 6.0
US_Hols 42.5 42.6 0.1
Difference 13.5 *** 10.0 *** 3.7
Quoted Depth (shares) Eur_Hols 1,132 1,234 -97 *
US_Hols 834 1,028 -194 ***
Difference 302 *** 222 *** 82
Participation Rate (%) Eur_Hols 48.64 38.46 11.26 ***
US_Hols 41.67 36.19 6.01 ***
Difference 6.79 *** 4.25 ** 4.68
Panel C: Liquidity Provision
Panel B: Transaction Costs
Panel A: Trading Activity
This table reports means for the European cross-listed stocks (Eur_Hols) and the matched U.S. stocks (US_Hols) during home 
exchange holidays. The overlapping period is when both the home exchange and the NYSE are normally open; the nonoverlapping 
period is the equal-length period immediately following the home exchange's normal close. Intraday volatility is the five-minute high 
minus low price, divided by the last trade price. Quoted spread is normalized by the quote midpoint and time-weighted. Effective 
spread is twice the difference between the trade price and the quote midpoint at the time of the trade, normalized by the trade price 
and volume-weighted. Quoted depth is the time-weighted average depth at the inside quotes. Participation rate is the sum of 
specialist buys and sells divided by the total trading volume. 
Data are from the NYSE CT, CQ, and SPET databases. Averages for each stock are calculated over the European market holidays in 
2003, ranging from two to ten days depending on the home exchange. Significance tests  are based on relative differences (taking the 
logarithm of each measure before computing standard errors and conducting the t-test for a difference in means) across 135 stocks in 
each sample and across 135 matched pairs in difference-of-difference tests. Differences that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels are designated by ***, **, and *, respectively.








Share volume Asia 69 111,055               61,023                 50,032                  ***
Can 66 198,301               109,891               88,410                  **
LatAm 64 57,004                 42,789                 14,215                  ***
Number of trades Asia 69 59                        44                        15                         ***
Can 66 117                      83                        34                         ***
LatAm 64 43                        36                        7                           ***
Intraday Volatility (bp) Asia 69 12.1 8.4 3.7 ***
Can 66 14.7 8.9 5.8 ***
LatAm 64 14.8 12.4 2.4 ***
Quoted Spread (bp) Asia 69 75.6 66.5 9.1 ***
Can 66 39.5 33.3 6.2 ***
LatAm 64 159.4 140.0 19.4 ***
Effective Spread (bp) Asia 69 57.4 49.8 7.6 ***
Can 66 31.8 25.6 6.1 ***
LatAm 64 109.6 99.3 10.3 ***
Quoted Depth (shares) Asia 69 18,172                 20,077                 -1,905 ***
Can 66 24,959                 28,894                 -3,935 *
LatAm 64 12,916                 14,623                 -1,708 ***
Participation Rate (%) Asia 69 45.70 41.10 4.54 ***
Can 66 33.46 30.21 3.25 ***
LatAm 64 45.98 40.32 5.66 ***
Differences that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are designated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
This table reports means for Asian (Asia), Canadian (Can), and Latin American (LatAm) cross-listed stocks. The First 2 hours are 9:30 - 
11:30, the Second 2 hours are 11:30:01 - 13:30 EST. Intraday volatility is the five-minute high minus low price, divided by the last trade 
price. Quoted spread is the offer price minus the bid price, normalized by the quote midpoint and time-weighted. Effective spread is twice 
the difference between the trade price and the quote midpoint at the time of the trade, normalized by the trade price and volume-weighted. 
Quoted depth is the time-weighted average depth at the inside quotes. Participation rate is the sum of specialist buys and sells divided by 
total trading volume. 
Data are from the NYSE CT, CQ, and SPET databases. Averages for each stock are calculated over 221 trading days in 2003. 
Significance tests are based on relative differences (taking the logarithm of each measure before computing standard errors and 
conducting the t-test for a difference in means) across the number of stocks in each sample. 
Panel C: Liquidity Provision
Panel A: Trading Activity
Panel B: Transaction Costs
First - Second 
2 hours
Figure 1: Comparison of NYSE and European exchange trading hours
Comparison of trading hours for the NYSE and the 14 European exchanges that are the home exchanges for the 135 
European cross-listed stocks. Number of stocks from each home exchange is in parentheses.   
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Bolsa de Madrid (6)
Oslo Børs (4)
Helsinki (3)
Irish Stock Exchange (3)
Copenhagen (2)
Wiener Börse (2)
Budapest (1)
Swiss (1)
Luxembourg (1)
